INTRODUCTION
ERISA is a comprehensive statute designed to promote the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee benefit plans.'
[E]very dollar provided in benefits is a dollar spent by . . . the employer; and every dollar saved . .. is a dollar in [the employer's] pocket. 2 The healthcare reform effort culminating in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) has focused, to date, on the plight of the uninsured and on barriers to insurance such as pre-existing condition exclusions. Reform efforts focus less often, however, on threats to healthcare benefits for people who do have health insurance. When insured individuals suffer a serious illness, does their insurance live up to its promise? One overlooked threat to the insured concerns administration of employer-sponsored health insurance plans. Specifically, participants' benefits are threatened by the lack of consequences when administrators of such plans improperly process claims for healthcare benefits by delaying the decision, failing to conduct a complete review, or simply denying the claim incorrectly.
For those covered by healthcare plans ("Participants"), a claim for benefits occurs each time the plan Participant seeks to access benefits under the plan. A Participant may seek benefits retrospectively or prospectively. In the case of a retrospective claim, a Participant seeks medical care and then files a claim with the plan, following the plan's prescribed process.4 The healthcare provider may file the claim on the Participant's behalf if the Participant has assigned benefits to the provider. 5 The Participant then waits for the decision-maker 6 to send the
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ERISA's regulations set out the specifics of claims processing, including guidelines that health insurance companies must follow when they establish internal rules for claims processing. The regulations set time limits for deciding claims and appeals, govern the content of notices to participants of claim denials and rights to appeal, and require consistent decisions on similar types of claims. These are largely procedural matters, but they affect the availability of benefits directly. Most denied claims are never appealed-if a claim is decided incorrectly or appeal rights are not conveyed, the incorrect denial simply stays undisturbed. 1 The current approach to claims regulation enforcement does not match the importance of these procedures in the lives of plan participants. For example, what is the consequence when a health insurance company does not abide by these claims processing regulations? What if a health insurance company improperly denies certain claims when they are initially filed, then pays those claims if they are appealed, perhaps banking on many Participants becoming discouraged and walking away without an appeal? What is the consequence if a health insurance company improperly denies a significant claim, then pays it only during litigation? As this Article will show, in each of these cases, the health insurance company suffers little or no penalty for violating claims regulations. And yet, the financial incentive to do so, thereby avoiding paying claims, is 19 enormous.
For Participants, the consequences are significant. An incorrect retrospective denial or underpayment results in either the Participant or the healthcare provider absorbing the unpaid costs. 20 And if the Participant is unable to absorb the cost, financial hardship or even medical bankruptcy may result. 21 necessary care. Such a denial may be life-threatening or even fatal. 22 Physicians and other healthcare providers also suffer when healthcare claims are improperly delayed or denied. Busy physician practices and other healthcare providers must devote additional time and personnel to appeals and follow-up. 23 And if providers do not follow up on improperly processed claims, they risk losing si nificant amounts of money for services that were legitimately provided.
This Article advocates a new framework for the enforcement of claimsprocessing regulations. Under the current ap roach, most non-compliance is excused under the "substantial compliance" doctrine, and even substantial departures from the claims regulations generally result in no substantive 26 remedy. This approach excuses practically all instances of regulatory non- 22 . In one such case, a father of four sought inpatient treatment for alcoholism; such treatment was expressly included as a term of his benefit plan. Andrews-Clarke v. Travelers Ins. Co., 984 F. Supp. 49, 52 (D. Mass. 1997). The utilization review provider, however, "repeatedly and arbitrarily denied" the treatment and refused to authorize it. Id. Lacking a private placement for treatment, a court that had conducted a commitment hearing ordered him to treatment in a correctional facility, where he received little treatment and was abused by other inmates. Id. at 51. The man died after consuming a six-pack of beer three weeks after his release. Id at 52. In the subsequent lawsuit that went "right to the heart of the benefit determination process," the court dismissed the surviving spouse's wrongful death, breach of contract, and other claims, noting that ERISA provided no other choice. Id at 53. The court referred to ERISA as a "legal Pac-Man" and noted that ERISA now provides a "shield of near absolute immunity [that] cannot be justified." Id. at 63. The court concluded that there was no legal choice but to "slam the courthouse doors in [the surviving spouse's] face and leave her without any remedy." Id. at 53. In another case, a plan administrator's delay in approving a bone marrow transplant procedure was alleged to have proven fatal, where cancer metastasized to the patient's brain during the delay period, thereby disqualifying her from having the bone marrow transplant. Bast v. Prudential Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the "unfortunate consequence of the compromise Congress made in drafting ERISA" left plaintiff without a remedy).
23. " [P] hysicians and practice staff should all participate in the audit process ... You might also consider hiring a consultant who specializes in billing and collections to assist in specified audit tasks." AM. MED. Ass'N, supra note 20, at I1.
24. See id. at 8-9 (citing numerous examples of physician practices whose claims were being underpaid, sometimes by as much as $100,000 per month).
25. The exact contours of the "substantial compliance" doctrine depend on the court applying it and the particular circumstances of the case. Generally, however, "substantial compliance" is understood to mean technical non-compliance with the claims regulations, such that the regulation's purpose is nonetheless accomplished. See, e.g., Larson v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 277 F. App'x 318, 321-22 (4th Cir. 2008) (holding that even if the administrator's communications did not technically comply with the regulations in that they did not give the basis for the claim denial, they provided a sufficient understanding of the administrator's position and therefore substantially complied).
26. See discussion of lack of incentives to comply infra Section II.B.
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compliance and places the enforcement burden on those least able to shoulder it-the individuals seeking and paying for medical care. Instead, ERISA's goal of ensuring contracted benefits would be better served if enforcement moved to a presumed-harm approach, akin to the approach used in numerous consumer finance laws. This Article argues that the same concerns driving consumer financial protections have even greater force where healthcare is concerned. Part I of this Article sets out the problem of improper claims processing and provides background on ERISA and its regulations. Part II examines the claims processing regulations and their current interpretation in the courts. Part III explains the case for a presumed-harm approach to enforcement of the claims processing regulations and suggests two remedies: First, non-compliance with claims processing regulations should be penalized through an expanded view of attorney's fee awards. Second, the Truth in Lending Act shows how ERISA reform could adopt the presumed-harm approach and thereby lend predictability, efficiency, and equity to the enforcement of ERISA's claims processing regulations.
I. THE CLAIMS PROCESSING PROBLEM AND ERISA
ERISA was enacted in 1974 with pension plan reform in mind. 27 At the time, few imagined that ERISA would serve such a significant role with regard to healthcare.28 Since 1974, increasing numbers of employers have redesigned their employee benefit plans as ERISA plans, in order to take advantage of the limited plaintiff remedies available under ERISA and ERISA's protection from state regulation.29 Today, ERISA governs most of America's non-Medicare healthcare coverage, 30 and ERISA's regulations set the ground rules for processing all healthcare claims are processed incorrectly. 38 More than ninety percent of claim denials, according to most estimates, are never appealed. 39 Of the denials that are appealed, about half are reversed in favor of the Participant. 40 Even though so many denied claims are never appealed, health insurance companies are not penalized when claims are denied upon initial submission and paid only upon first or second appeal.41 Even a procedural violation, such as a failure to communicate appeal rights, may be excused if the error is cured at some later point.42 This regulatory approach provides no remedy for the many Participants that drop out of the appeals process at the first miscommunication.
At the same time, health insurance companies and employers offering selfinsured plans (together, "Payors") profit enormously when claims are denied or otherwise diminished.43 Empirical research links higher net profits with an increased tendency to discount or deny claims. 44 Therefore, Payors, whether 38. Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n., National Health Insurer Report Card (June 14, 2010), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/physician-resources/solutions-managing-your -practice/coding-billing-insurance/heal-claims-process/national-health-insurer-report-card.shtml (reporting that approximately twenty percent of claims are processed incorrectly and advocating a uniform, national set of standards for processing healthcare claims); see also Press Release, Cal. Nurses Ass'n/Nat'l Nurses Org. Comm., California's Real Death Panels: Insurers Deny 21% of Claims (Sept. 2, 2009), available at http://www.calnurses.org/media-center/press-releases/2009/ september/california-s-real-death-panels-insurers-deny-21-of-claims.html (estimating the denial rate at twenty-one percent and quoting the organization's co-president Deborah Burger, stating "[t]he routine denial of care by private insurers is like the elephant in the room no one in the present national healthcare debate seems to want to talk about").
39. See Whether plans are fully insured or self-insured, incorrect denials amount to enhanced profit for the would-be Payor. In the case of fully insured plans, the decision-maker and Payor are the same entity, such that money saved on participants' medical care equates to greater amounts of money available for salaries, administrative expenses, and profits.46 Accordingly, courts recognize the conflict that arises when the same entity both determines benefit eligibility and pays benefits. 4 7 In the case of self-funded plans, the financial conflict analysis is different, because claims processing is generally handled by a third-party administrator (TPA), at least with regard to initial claims decisions.48 There is, however, no prohibition against an employer's administering claims in-house, and some larger employers may choose to do so if they have the necessary personnel and resources to assess claims. 4 9 Employers may rely on a TPA for utilization review as well. Where a TPA processes claims for the ultimate Payor-the employerthe conflict of interest may be less direct than if the ultimate Payor determines eligibility and then pays claims directly out of its own pocket.
But a Payor's delegation of some day-to-day plan operations to a TPA, which serves at the pleasure of the Payor, does not necessarily neutralize the conflict. While the conflict may be somewhat attenuated when the Payor does not also act as the decision-maker, the Payor may still have a hand in the process in several ways: through the terms of its relationship with the TPA, through 45. DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442, 459 (3d Cir. 2003) ("ERISA's remedial scheme gives HMOs every incentive to act in their own and not in their beneficiaries' interest while simultaneously making it incredibly difficult for plan participants to pursue what meager remedies they possess, a confounding result for a statute whose original purpose was to protect employees.").
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., INSURANCE COMPANIES PROSPER, FAMILIES
SUFFER, available at http://nchc.org/sites/default/files/resources/insuranceprofits.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2011) (noting that three of the top five insurers spent less on participant medical care, while spending more on "salaries, administrative expenses, and profits"). influence over the TPA, or through retention of control over appealed claims.
50
As one court explained, "delegation of claims administration does not negate a structural conflict outright."
51 Although the Payor delegates claims responsibili1 to the TPA, the Payor may still influence the TPA's decision-making process. For example, in one case where the employer had delegated the decision as to whether benefits should be provided, the court found evidence that the employer still retained some oversight of the process and gave financial incentives to the TPA if the plan was administered as the employer wished.
5 3 Thus, Payors retain control of the claims process, to varying degrees ranging from some control to considerable control, despite delegation to a TPA. 54 Correct initial processing of claims is particularly important because plan administrators' decisions are given deference by the courts under ERISA. In 1989, the Court decided that where plan terms give the plan administrator discretion to determine benefit eligibility and interpret plan terms, plan administrators' decisions should be given deference unless the decisions are arbitrary and capricious. Each circuit court of appeals articulates and applies the arbitrary and capricious standard slightly differently, but a decision is typically considered arbitrary and capricious if there was no reasonable basis for the decision.56 If the determination is one of medical necessity, for example, a plan administrator must take treating physicians' opinions into account, but is free to disagree with treating physicians if the plan reviewers find other evidence more compelling. 57 And, as explained above, even if the plan administrator is a separate entity from the Payor, the Payor generally selects and hires the plan administrator and may well retain direct or indirect control over claims processing, such that the conflict remains. If the plan does not grant discretion to the administrator to determine benefit eligibility and 60 interpret plan terms, then the decision must be reviewed de novo. In a de novo review, the court does not defer to the plan administrator's decision, but instead interprets the plan and reviews the evidence itself in order to decide the claim for benefits.61 However, the Court is increasingly narrowing the circumstances under which de novo review is available, and the Court recently reaffirmed its approval of the abuse of discretion standard and noted its disapproval of ad hoc exceptions to deferential review.62 Because of this deference and because so few Participants pursue their rights to appeal and sue, the accuracy of the initial claims decision and the communication of the Participants' rights are critically important in . 63 achieving ERISA's goal of ensuring contracted benefits.
B. ERISA's Purpose and Background
The ERISA claims processing reulations derive from the larger ERISA scheme that was enacted in 1974.
Congress enacted ERISA to protect Participants' interests in employer-sponsored benefit 6 lans by setting out regulations and providing access to the federal courts. In enacting ERISA, a seventeen-year-old's intensive inpatient treatment for serious mental illness and substance abuse was not medically necessary, despite treating physicians' opinion that it was).
58. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 120 (2008) (noting that the conflict-ofinterest concern applies to the "lion's share" of ERISA benefit denial cases).
59. 
C. Basis in Trust Law
In developing ERISA, Congress did not create a new legal approach, but instead imported trust law as ERISA's framework. 70 ERISA sets out fiduciary duties applicable to the administration of plans,71 including the rules of loyalty and prudence and the exclusive benefit rule.72 Instead of setting out all of the specific powers of trustees and other fiduciaries, Congress imported the common law of trusts to describe the responsibilities of ERISA fiduciaries. Under ERISA, those who exercise discretion over management of the plan or who are named as fiduciaries in the plan are subject to fiduciary duties, and so is any person exercising material discretion over plan assets or administration. 74 This means that the individuals who make healthcare benefit decisions are acting as fiduciaries and are bound by these duties; ERISA's legislative history supports the imposition of fiduciary duties upon those who make claims determinations and pay plan benefits.
75
ERISA fiduciaries must discharge their duties with respect to the plan "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries. . . ."76 Fiduciaries are also required to carry out their duties "in accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan[.]"n The traditional trustee "is not permitted to place himself in a position where it would be for his own benefit to violate his duty to the beneficiaries." 7 8 Under ERISA, however, a trustee can be in exactly that position, having financial interests directly opposed to plan Participants. An ERISA fiduciary can be in the position of making healthcare claims determinations that, if decided against the beneficiary, would place additional funds in the fiduciary's employer's pocket to the beneficiary's detriment. 80 ERISA, therefore, imports trust law but ignores one of trust law's most important principles-the principle that plan fiduciaries should not breach their duties to beneficiaries and, certainly, should not be in a position to benefit financially from breaching those duties. Given these diametrically opposed interests and the profit-earning goals of Payors, additional incentives to comply with claims processing regulations are needed, as set out below. 
D. Preemption and Enforcement
ERISA preempts all state laws that "relate to" ERISA plans, as well as any cause of action that duplicates or supplants a claim under ERISA's enforcement -- 81 provisions. ERISA thus takes away most state-law claims and remedies, but courts struggle with what, if anything, ERISA provides in their place. Indeed, the preemption provision often takes away state-law claims but gives no replacement claim at all.82 ERISA's preemption provision was always intended to be broad. 83 But, Congress also intended that ERISA would be supplemented by a federal common law, developed in the federal courts and tailored to ERISA and its purposes. 84 As explained below in Subsection II.B.4, no such remedial, tailored federal common law has emerged.
The remedies available under ERISA are notoriously limited, heightening the need for plan administrators to determine initial claims and appeals accurately. ERISA typically provides little relief when administrators violate claims regulations by, for example, failing to give adequate notice about appeals or reviewing a claim improperly, even though these violations often leave legitimate claims unpaid.
ERISA contains an integrated civil enforcement scheme consisting of the six provisions found in section 1132(a2 of the statute; these are the exclusive means of enforcing ERISA's provisions. ERISA Faced with a claim denial, a Participant must first appeal according to a plan's internal procedures. An internal appeal generally results in appealing a claim once or twice within the health insurance company or third-party administrator's system.89 After exhausting these administrative remedies, the Participant is then eligible to file an ERISA lawsuit in federal court. Under the basic claim for benefits, a participant brings a cause of action under ERISA section 501(a)(1), for "benefits due." This provision permits recovery of the benefit's value. ERISA contains an attorney's fee provision permitting the award of attorney's fees to either party, within the court's discretion. 90 ERISA provides that plaintiffs can recover equitable relief under certain circumstances.91 Despite careful and convincing scholarship to the contrary, the Supreme Court does not include a make-whole remedy within those remedies. 92 Thus, if the Participant wins the lawsuit, the Participant is generally awarded the value of the benefit and nothing more. 93 Under current Supreme Court authority, to be exclusive."). This exchange of traditional remedies for ERISA remedies has come to be known as the "ERISA bargain"-the idea that in exchange for security in benefits, employees gave up their traditional state-law remedies. The "ERISA bargain" is recognized by courts and is frequently cited when the intersection between ERISA's broad preemption provision and the lack of any equivalent federal remedy results in harms without remedies:
Plaintiffs and employees similarly situated receive the many protections of ERISA in exchange for certain rights to sue under previous federal and state law. Congress has decided that they are better off for the bargain. Whatever injustices this scheme may tolerate in isolated instances are more than compensated by the general security provided to pension rights under ERISAplaintiffs themselves are now enjoying the fruits of rights which Caterpillar could not and cannot divest. If workers deserve further protection, it will be up to Congress to provide it. http://www.kff.org/insurance/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf On average, external reviews overturn forty-five percent of denials submitted to them. Id. at v-vi. External reviews are, however, complicated to access and underused; in New York, for example, only 902 consumers filed for external review in the reporting year ending in June 2000, although 8.4 million consumers are covered by the external review law in that state. Id. ERISA does not contemplate extra-contractual damages for consequential harms, even when the result is that the Participant is not made whole. 94 The Participant might also receive attorney's fees at the court's discretion. 95 Thus, if a claim is improperly denied, and the Participant appeals within the plan, pursues a federal lawsuit and wins, the Participant stands to gain only the value of the benefit that was denied. Attorney's fees may be awarded, but are not presumed. The current lack of consequential and punitive damages means that the improper denial is typically not separately and distinctly penalized at all. Because of these features of the ERISA regime, the accuracy and completeness of the initial claims review is doubly important and should be incentivized accordingly.
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g) (2006).

Id § I 132(a)(3)(B).
WOOTEN, supra
II. A REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WITH LITTLE INCENTIVE TO COMPLY
As currently interpreted, the regulations that govern claims processing do not contain incentives to comply with any precision. Unless the regulatory violation results in serious, direct harm, noncompliance is generally excused under the "substantial compliance" doctrine set out below. Even where noncompliance is substantial, ERISA provides no substantive remedy. In most cases, even after a Participant has sued in federal court, the plan administrator is not penalized but is simply instructed to go back and take the action that it should have taken in the first instance.
A. The Regulatory Background
Department of Labor (DOL) regulations set out a framework of minimum standards for processing healthcare benefit claims.96 ERISA authorizes these regulations and provides that every employee benefit plan shall give adequate notice of a claim denial and afford a reasonable opportunity for a full review of denied claims. 97 Participants must exhaust these internal processes before filing suit in federal court, but the internal claims and appeal processes are deemed exhausted in the absence of strict compliance with the claims regulations.
98
The PPACA added new requirements for internal claims review and appeal 
29 U.S.C. § 1132(g).
96. Most of the regulations apply to claims for healthcare benefits but also to claims for benefits under other types of ERISA plans. Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 220 (2004) ("These regulations, on their face, apply equally to health benefit plans and other plans, and do not draw distinctions between medical and nonmedical benefits determinations."). processes, as well as external review. 99 The new regulations apply to employee benefit plans (and other types of group health plans) for plan years beginning September 23, 2010.100 The regulations do not apply to "grandfathered" plans, that is, plans that were in effect before the enactment of the PPACA that have not been significantly altered in terms of coverage or benefits.o 10 Under the regulations, plan administrators have an obligation to maintain reasonable claims procedures.102 Claims procedures are defined as unreasonable if they contain any provision unduly inhibiting the processing of claims, such as requiring a person to receive prior authorization when the person is unconscious or requiring that a person pay a fee to appeal a claim denial.1 03 Procedures must contain "administrative processes and safeguards" designed to ensure that plan provisions are interpreted and aplied consistently, and that decisions are made according to plan documents.'o Claims for benefits must be processed within thirty days after the plan's receipt of the claim, unless the plan administrator determines that a fifteen-day extension is necessary and sends written notice of the extension. os The statute does not require Payors to pay interest on late-paid claims.
If a claim is denied, a written denial must set out the basis for the denial, reference the specific plan provision upon which the decision was based, and give a description of any additional material or information needed to pursue the claim.1 06 If an internal rule, guideline, protocol, or similar criterion was relied upon in the denial, that rule or criterion must be disclosed to the claimant upon request.107 In addition, the notice must be written "in a manner calculated to be 08 The notice must also contain appropriate information as to the steps required if the Participant wishes to submit the claim for review. 109 When benefits are denied, the plan must afford the Participant the opportunity for a full and fair review.110
Id. § 2560.503-1(g)(v)(A), (j)(5)(i); see also FAQs About the Benefit Claims
The new regulations expand the definition of adverse benefit determination to include a coverage rescission (a cancellation or discontinuance of coverage), such that rescissions of coverage are subject to internal review just as any other adverse benefit determination would be.'I' Notably, the regulations revise the conflict-of-interest rules so that compensation of claims-processing personnel cannot be directly tied to the proportion of claims denied. 12 All of these new regulations amount to progress for the plan Participant-but the lack of compliance still results in no direct, substantive remedy. The new regulations also expand the availability of external review of denied healthcare claims. Plans and issuers not presently subject to a state external review process will be subject to a federal process. 1 The preamble to the regulations explains that ERISA preemption prevents a state external review process from applying to most selfinsured lans and that these plans are now subject to the federal external review process. 14 An external review process, however, represents yet another step that Participants must take in order to reverse an improperly denied claim.
To fully protect Participants, many of whom will never follow up on denied claims, Payors must be incentivized to comply with the regulations by accurately processing and properly approving claims in the first place.
B. Little Incentive To Comply
While the regulations set out specific requirements for claims processing, rules, guidelines, protocols, or similar criteria would constitute instruments under which a plan is established or operated within the meaning of section 104(b)(4) of ERISA and, as such, must be disclosed to participants and beneficiaries.").
108. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(g).
109
. Under the regulations applicable to this section, the denial notice must contain: (1) the specific reason or reasons for the denial; (2) specific reference to the pertinent plan provisions on which the denial is based; (3) a description of any additional material or information necessary for claimant to perfect the claim and an explanation of why such information is necessary; and (4) appropriate information as to the steps to be taken if the participant or beneficiary wishes to submit his or her claim for review. Id.
Participants have little recourse when plan administrators do not comply. Many violations are excused through the generous "substantial compliance" doctrine; more serious or continuing process violations are often conflated with the claim denial at issue and rarely result in an independent, substantive remedy. Only the most flagrant violations provoke a targeted judicial response, and even then, the remedy is almost always procedural rather than substantive. ls The claim may be returned to the plan administrator for processing in compliance with the plan terms and ERISA regulations, but the Participant receives no compensation for the delay or for the time and effort devoted to appealing the claim and filing a lawsuit.
The regulations as currently interpreted provide little incentive to reject the following strategic approaches to payment of healthcare claims:
* As described below, these strategies and other kinds of non-compliance are insufficiently addressed by the current regulations and ERISA's enforcement regime. Indeed, ERISA, as currently interpreted, effectively invites such strategic approaches to claims processing.
The "Substantial Compliance" Doctrine Sets the Bar Low
When Participants progress through the internal appeals process and on to federal court, the court first determines whether the non-compliance was substantial and whether the administrator complied with the regulations' purpose. In the case of non-substantial violations, courts apply the judicially created "substantial compliance" doctrine, which excuses many instances of noncompliance. This doctrine relaxes the technical requirements, excusing noncompliance so long as a "meaningful dialogue" between plan administrator and Participant takes place.
Depending on the particular court's analysis, the "substantial compliance" doctrine has thepotential to excuse strict compliance or compliance with multiple regulations.
A Payor can, for example, delay a decision on the claim beyond the regulatory deadlines and still be within Participant.
In addition, non-compliance with the regulations at initial levels of appeal may be excused if the plan administrator's acts during a subsequent level of appeal effectively cure the initial non-compliance.126 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that this approach is in keeping with the regulations' goal of encouraging a meaningful dialogue rather than any particular technical compliance. 2 Significantly, however, this ability to later "cure" any earlier regulatory non-compliance essentially gives companies a second chance to comply, negating the importance of strict initial compliance.
Substantial Noncompliance Results in Remand Rather Than a Substantive Remedy
Even significant regulatory violations rarely trigger a substantive remedy.128 Remand to the plan administrator for a full and fair review is the most common remedy for substantial regulatory noncompliance.129 But the regulatory violation itself usually makes little substantive difference to the outcome, because the regulatory violation tends to be conflated with the accompanying improper denial of benefits. 130 Indeed, there is no clear agreement as to whether regulatory non- 129. See Lafleur, 563 F.3d at 157 (explaining that remand is typically appropriate and preferable to substantive remedy).
130. Where, for example, an administrator changed the basis for its denial of disability benefits and failed to identify its vocational expert as specifically required by the regulations, the Fifth Circuit found that defendant, Aetna Life Insurance Company, had violated the claims regulations in a manner that constituted "more than mere technical noncompliance. compliance can independently result in a remedy at all. 13 1 Without any such remedy, administrators perpetuating the vast majority of claims regulations violations tend to suffer no effects other than to be instructed to do what they should have done in the first place. For example, an administrator who fails to provide the full and fair review of a claim as required by ERISA is frequently ordered to go back and conduct the same full and fair review that it should originally have conducted.132 Likewise, although the claims regulations clearly set out deadlines for making claims decisions, in case after case, administrators suffer no consequence from ignoring the regulations. Instead, the courts most often simply instruct the administrator to approve the initially denied claim, providing the administrator more time in which to do so. 133 When a claim decision is delayed beyond the regulatory deadlines, there is no penalty except that the claim is "deemed denied" so that the Participant can immediately seek relief in the federal courts. 134 Even where claims on internal , 1999 ) (holding that where insurer had failed to make its decision within the regulatory deadline and had given no notice of any special circumstances requiring an extension the insurer had "neither strictly nor substantially complied" with section 2560.503-1(h) the equitable result was to dismiss plaintiffs lawsuit and give Payor another fourteen days to make its decision appeal are deemed denied due to administrator inaction, thereby forcing Participants to go to federal court to even receive a decision on the benefit claim, the deferential standard of review applied to the majority of initial denials is generally left intact. 135 Thus, the Participant, who may have been forced to seek relief in federal court in order to receive a decision on a relatively small dollar amount, can still be denied that relief.
The Most Flagrant Violations Do Not Result in a Substantive Remedy
Even the most serious and continuing violations of ERISA claims regulations rarely result in a substantive remedy.1 3 6 The "paradigmatic example" of this most serious type of violation is the Blau case, in which "the defendants failed to comply with virtually every applicable mandate of ERISA."
1 37 In that case, participants were denied benefits under a welfare plan.138 Upon litigation of the denial, the court found that the claims procedure did not exist in any recognizable form: "[T]here was no summary plan description, no claims procedure, and no provision to inform participants in writing of anything.
[The] claims procedure fail[ed] simply because there was none." 39 The court noted that where procedural violations are so extreme, they "alter the very balance of knowledge and rights between covered employees and their employer." 14 0
For extreme cases such as these, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, contemplates a substantive remedy-in the form of a retroactive treated as being denied after the regulatory deadlines pass, enabling the claimant to bring a civil action to have the claim's merits determined by the court); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(h)(4) (2010) (governing regulatory deadlines).
135. A severe procedural violation can result in the denial decision being treated with less deference, lowering the standard of review and leading the courts to conduct a de novo review of the administrator's denial of benefits.142 The reasoning is that by ignoring the claims procedures, the administrator has essentially failed to exercise its contractually accorded discretion, such that there is no exercise of discretion for the court to review.143 The administrator may also have violated the procedures mandated by ERISA in a way that is "so flagrant as to alter the substantive relationship between the employer and employee, thereby causing the beneficiary substantive harm." 1 44 The altered standard of review does not of course necessarily result in any award of benefits or any other remedy: if a de novo review does not uncover any error in the denial of benefits, the denial remains intact and no remedy is given.
Even this relatively slight remedy may be in doubt. In a recent opinion, the Supreme Court suggested that an administrator's failure to abide by fiduciary duties should not result in a de novo standard of review. 145 The Court examined the effect of the conflict of interest resulting from an insurer acting as the plan administrator, and whether that dual role should imply a lowering of the standard of review from abuse of discretion to de novo.146 The Court held that the abuse of discretion standard should remain intact, but that the administrator's conflict of interest should be a factor in determining whether the administrator abused its discretion in denying the claim. 14 7 Given this adherence to the abuse of discretion standard in the case of a conflict of interest, the Court could accordingly find that a procedural violation should likewise be a part of the review, rather than a reason to alter the standard. In a small minority of cases, courts have viewed a violation of the claim processing regulations alone as an abuse of discretion that could justify an award of benefits. But in these cases, the violation of regulations still did not result in a substantive remedy, because in each case the benefits should have been awarded on the merits anyway. Thus, the defendant again does not suffer any independent penalty for failing to follow the claims regulations, because the benefits should have been awarded in the first place. 149 Where, for example, a defendant disability insurance company failed to obtain the X-rays that it should have obtained to properly assess plaintiffs claim, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff and cited its intention to create a deterrent effect towards other insurers. 150 The court did not use the plan's failure to obtain information as a means of lowering the applicable standard of review. Instead, it applied the abuse of discretion standard and found that the defendant had abused its discretion by failing to provide a full and fair review.151 The court noted, however, that the plaintiff was in fact disabled, meaning that the effect of the court's decision was simply that the administrator was forced to do what it should have done in the first instance.152
Freestanding Claims for Breach ofFiduciary Duty Fail To Address Regulatory Non-compliance
Section 1132(A)(3)(b) of ERISA is a "catch-all" provision that gives Participants a potential cause of action for breaches of fiduciary duty such as regulatory non-compliance; injunctive and other equitable remedies are 149. Salley v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 966 F.2d 1011, 1015 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that plan administrator's failure to obtain records from child's second and third hospitalization amounted to abuse of plan administrator's discretion and awarding benefits and attorney's fees to Participant). In this case, the treating physicians agreed that the Participant's hospitalization was medically necessary, while the physicians reviewing the claim for the plan said that the hospitalization was not medically necessary. Id. The reviewing physicians had neither examined the Participant nor obtained records regarding two of the three hospitalizations. The court noted that these records would have shown that the hospitalizations were medically necessary. Id.
150. Beauvais v. Citizens Fin. Group Inc., 418 F. Supp. 2d 22, 33 (D.RJ. 2006). The court's judgment included an award of past and future disability benefits (because the disability was supported by medical evidence), medical benefits under a plan for which the defendant had been found ineligible due to her lack of disability status, and attorney's fees. The court expressed disapproval of the insurer's actions and awarded attorney's fees and reinstated plaintiff's medical benefits. In awarding attorney's fees, the court noted that such a remedy would serve as a deterrent to other plan administrators inclined to deny benefits based on a failure to produce records they never requested, "a deterrent that will benefit all plan participants. The "catch-all" provision provides an avenue to remedy breaches of plan terms and regulations. This section gives Participants the right to bring a civil action "(A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this title or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this title or the terms of the plan."1 55 This section is described as a "safety net, offering appropriate equitable relief for injuries caused by violations that other recourse available under ERISA does not adequately remedy." 1 56 Under this provision, Participants may sue breaching fiduciaries for traditionally available equitable remedies. 7 Any person exercising "material discretion" over plan assets or administration is subject to fiduciary duties. 158 Thus, individuals who make healthcare benefit decisions such as claims determinations are acting as fiduciaries and are bound by these duties. 159 Each time an administrator fails to comply with the regulations, it breaches its fiduciary duties. 160 Significantly, a breach of fiduciary duty cause of action does not require loss by https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol11/iss2/3 the plaintiff; gain by the defendant is sufficient.161 That is, if a defendant "has made a profit through the violation of a duty to the plaintiff to whom he is in a fiduciary relation, he can be compelled to surrender the profit to the plaintiff although the profit was not made at the expense of the plaintiff."'1 62 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), for example, has obtained relief in the form of equitable accounting for profits against defendants violating the securities laws.
The fiduciary duty cause of action and equitable relief, however, have proven inadequate to address ERISA refulatory non-compliance effectively. Claims for equitable accounting for profits have met with some success under limited circumstances-for example, a fiduciary that improperly withholds 161. Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum, 73 F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D. Pa. 1947) ("The plaintiffs case was established when the defendants' duty and its breach were proved. This was done by showing that the defendants were officers and directors of Western and that they disposed of the bulk of the corporate assets to an outsider, for their own benefit . . . . The remedy follows, which, in this case, is an accounting to ascertain and restore . . . the profits, if any."). Whether or not trust law includes a make-whole remedy for ERISA plaintiffs is the subject of considerable scholarly debate and judicial comment. For complete analysis of this issue, see Langbein, supra note 66, at 1333. However, the disgorgement remedy sidesteps this debate, because disgorgement is not intended to benefit the wronged beneficiary, but to prevent the unjust enrichment of the fiduciary. See Parke v. First Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 368 F.3d 999, 1008-09 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that the equitable accounting and unjust enrichment disgorgement remedies fit within those traditionally available in equity). RESTITUTION  § 160(d), at 646 (1937) ; see also Langbein, supra note 66, at 1333 ("An aggrieved trust beneficiary ... may recover (1) for loss incurred, (2) for any profits that the trustee made in breach of trust, and (3) for any gains that would have accrued but for the breach.").
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163. Where, for example, a defendant was found to have aided and abetted in primary violations of books and records, net capital, and reporting violations of the federal securities laws, the defendant was ordered to disgorge the profits earned by those wrongs, including commissions paid to the defendant and markups on securities. SEC v. Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1363 (S.D.  Fla. 2008) . In such cases, the calculation need not be done with complete certainty. SEC v. Patel, 61 F.3d 137, 139-40 (2d Cir. 1995) (noting that plaintiff need only establish "a reasonable approximation of profits causally connected to the violation" to establish the amount owed); Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. Indeed, in analogous situations under the securities laws, once a reasonable approximation of the amount of unjust enrichment is established, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the approximation is unreasonable. Solow, 554 F. Supp. 2d at 1363. The risk of uncertainty in calculating the remedy falls on the defendant, whose illegal actions created the uncertainty. Id.
164. Accounting for profits is "a restitutionary remedy based upon avoiding unjust enrichment. In this sense, it reaches monies owed by a fiduciary or other wrongdoer, including profits produced by property which in equity and good conscience belonged to the plaintiff." benefits can be held liable for interest on the withheld money on an unjust enrichment theory.165 But while the "catch-all" provision cause of action is an avenue against a plan administrator or ultimate payor's unjust enrichment through improper claims processing, this cause of action is difficult to prove and often unfruitful.166 Any individual instance of non-compliance (such as a failure to communicate appeal rights or the basis for a denial) does not result in significant unjust enrichment to the defendant beyond the amount of the denied claim. In addition, this cause of action does not capture the most significant unjust enrichment of defendants resulting from regulatory non-compliance: The cost savings where claims are improperly denied and not appealed. The unjust enrichment of Payors is more difficult to quantify in an ERISA breach of fiduciary duty claim than in other areas of the law, such as securities law, in which the wrongdoing more often results in a greater single, traceable profit.
Empirical research has found a correlation between higher Payor denial rates and profits.167 And under trust law, the benefits gained in breach of a trust are subject to equitable disgorgement. When the denials conflict with the terms of ERISA plans and the Payors' or plan administrators' fiduciary duties to Participants, the unpaid monies should be recoverable, not as compensation to Participants, but as equitable disgorgement due to unjust enrichment.
Here again, trust law proves inadequate to address the particular needs of ERISA plans, because its application has led only to confusing and uncertain results. ERISA's legislative history makes clear that the courts are expected to develop the federal common law of ERISA to develop the "appropriate equitable relief' set out in 1132(a)(3)(B) and other areas of ERISA that were not explicitly drawn.16 But this section has not led to any clear remedies, and uncertainty still exists as to exactly what relief this provision can provide.
Where a single cause of action is too minimal to bring alone, but the wrong being addressed appears to occur pervasively, the class action mechanism may 167. Greenberg et al., supra note 43, at 633 (finding a "strong positive correlation" between net profit margin and the adjusted odds that the plan would discount the cost of a day's stay in the hospital).
168. Senator Jacob Javits, for example, is often cited as noting that the federal courts were to develop "a body of Federal substantive law ... to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare and pension plans." 120 CONG. REC. 29,942 (1974 provide an avenue for recovery. But class actions have not been a panacea for ERISA non-compliance. Participant classes frequently founder on requirements such as commonality of legal and factual issues, and the causal link between the alleged wrongdoing and resulting damages can be too remote.
For example, where proposed Participant classes have brought lawsuits for interest on denied or delayed claims, courts have found that individualized analysis is required and class action treatment is unsuitable.169 That is, unless the class meets the requirements under the Federal Rules of Procedure to be brought as a class action, all the parties must be joined and the lawsuit cannot go forward as a class action.170 Some narrowly drawn classes seeking injunctive relief for specific, plan-wide improper treatment of claims are permitted to go forward.171 But in order for the class of Participants to have a significant chance of certification, the class must be carefully drawn, the remedy sought must be distinct from the claim for benefits, and the equitable remedy must be traceable to the alleged harm.172 The class action vehicle is therefore an uncertain and ungainly tool against most instances of regulatory non-compliance.
Thus, regulatory non-compliance in the processing of healthcare claims for the most part results in no remedy at all. The most flagrant examples may result in a procedural action such as remand for further review, but regulatory noncompliance for the most part leads to no substantive remedy. Given the deferential standard of review applied to plan administrators' decisions and the 170. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ("One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all class members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."). financial conflicts inherent in the process, the available remedies for regulatory non-compliance are simply inadequate to protect Participants' access to their promised benefits.
III. THE PRESUMED HARM APPROACH TO ENFORCEMENT OF CLAIMS PROCESSING REGULATIONS
If compliance with claims regulations is to be attractive, non-compliance must be financially unattractive. 17 3 Currently, financial incentives weigh heavily in favor of non-compliance, because non-compliance generally results in no substantive remedy. Two possible approaches to enforcement of claims regulations would disincentivize non-compliance with claims processing regulations. The discretionary attorney's fee remedy could be used more aggressively to penalize regulatory non-compliance, as a minority of courts is already doing. In the longer term, ERISA's enforcement provision and regulations could explicitly adopt the presumed-harm approach of consumer finance statutes.
A. Recognizing the Harm: Attorney's Fees as Deterrent to Regulatory Noncompliance
Where a defendant fails to comply with claims regulations, some courts award attorney's fees, even if the defendant cures the non-compliance during litigation or the claim is remanded to the plan administrator for further review. Whether it be purposeful or negligent, insurance companies regularly reduce and deny claims without cause, thereby increasing the cost of healthcare to providers and patients alike. If it became cost prohibitive for insurance companies to engage in that behavior, it would incentivize more accurate claims administration and processing in the future. An award of attorney's fees acts as some deterrent to plan administrators who would delay or deny claims improperly, and this approach can be more widely adopted in order to encourage compliance with claims processing regulations.
In ERISA cases, courts have discretion to award attorney's fees to either party.
1 75 A court may award attorney's fees to either party if the party receives "some degree of success on [the] merits."
17 6 An award of ERISA attorney's fees generally begins with analysis of the following factors:
(1) the degree of opposing parties' culpability or bad faith; (2) ability of opposing parties to satisfy an award of attorneys' fees; (3) whether an award of attorneys' fees against the opposing parties would deter other persons acting under similar circumstances; (4) whether the parties requesting attorneys' fees sought to benefit all participants and beneficiaries of an ERISA plan or to resolve a significant legal question regarding ERISA itself; and (5) the relative 177 merits of the parties' positions.
The factors are not statutory, but are flexible guidelines that courts have used to guide this discretionary analysis.
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When a court finds that a plan administrator has not complied with claims regulations and the court remands the claim to the plan administrator, a plaintiff may well receive no attorney's fee award.179 As courts address each of the five attorney's fee factors, non-compliance with claims processing regulations often does not amount to the "culpability or bad faith" addressed in the first attorney's fee factor.so And, where claims processing is concerned, a deterrent effect on 175. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1) (2006) (providing that in any ERISA action "by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary, the court in its discretion may allow a reasonable attorney's fee and costs of action to either party").
176. Moreover, in addressing the fourth factor, value to other plan participants, most courts understand an ERISA claim dispute as an individual matter, such that the lawsuit has no value to other participants.1 82
A few courts, however, are leading the way in a broader, more consumeroriented approach. These courts are using an award of attorney's fees to serve as a disincentive to improperly process claims or deny or delay claims until a lawsuit is filed.1 83 Broadening the usual constricted view of ERISA remedies, these courts note the present disincentives to adhere to claims processing procedures, and they award fees against plan administrators who refuse to follow the claims processing regulations. 84 These courts look to the incentives created by the lack of ERISA remedies and the comparatively small number of benefit regulation violations that are actually brought to court. As one such court observed:
[A]n award of attorney's fees . . . is an important deterrent measure: first, because of the limited remedy available to ERISA plaintiffs . . . insurers should be dissuaded from prematurely suspending benefits with the hope that some claimants will not sue; and second, because an award of attorney's fees ensures that attorneys continue to take on ERISA cases in which the potential monetary award may be limited.
185
These courts analyze the ERISA attorney's fee factors differently and with ERISA's overall context in mind. Confronted directly with plan administrators' recalcitrance, or even a cavalier attitude toward ERISA regulations, the consumer-oriented courts are finding fee awards appropriate under a broader view of the five factors. 
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governing attorney's fee awards under a broad, remedial lens. In considering the deterrent effect of a fee award, the court noted case law explaining that an attorney's fee award should deter violations of ERISA as well as unnecessary prolongation or unjust resolution of claims.190 The court also noted the plan administrator's "cavalier attitude" toward ERISA's regulatory deadlines.1 9 1
While many courts still interpret ERISA's damage provisions narrowly, the broader view of ERISA attorney's fees for regulatory violations appears to be gaining ground in the face of the scant remedies otherwise available.1 The attorney's fee solution is, however, far from a panacea. Attorney's fees are not available for administrative action without litigation, so the availability of attorney's fees is no detriment at all to administrators who would refuse to pay claims initially and then pay on appeal or settle the claim as soon as litigation is initiated.1 93 Furthermore, while more consistent fee awards may act as some deterrent to non-compliance with claims regulations, the attorney's fee provision remains discretionary and therefore uncertain. The attorney's fee provision of ERISA amounts to some financial disincentive against ignoring claims processing regulations. But given the minute percentage of denied claims that proceed through the internal appeal and litigation processes to final judgment, the 
1995)).
191. Id. at *4 (noting with disapproval Payor's insistence that it had not backdated documents so as to appear to be in compliance with regulatory deadlines, because it had no incentive to do so-violation of the regulatory deadline would likely have no effect on Payor anyway). In addition, the court considered the benefit that this lawsuit would confer on others. The court found that the plaintiffs ability to enforce the terms of an insurance contract and perhaps dissuade insurance companies from denying benefits until a lawsuit is filed was a benefit to other plan participants and therefore a factor in the analysis. Instead of weighing in favor of the defendant as in the usual case, this factor, the court found, weighed equally in favor of the plaintiff and defendant. Id. at *5. chance of an attorney's fee award being assessed against a plan administrator remains slim.
B. Presuming the Harm: A Regulatory Solution to Claims Processing Noncompliance
Consistent enforcement of ERISA's regulations calls for an approach akin to that of consumer financial protections such as the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).19 TILA's Regulation Z,195 for example, sets out requirements for disclosure of consumer finance terms and provides penalties for non-compliance regardless of actual harm. Similar enforcement of claims regulations under ERISA would lend consistency to the enforcement process by providing a clear incentive for administrators to comply with claims processing regulations.
A regulatory solution to the problem of claims processing begins by recognizing that trust law requires supplementation in order to fulfill ERISA's purpose: the provision of contracted benefits. At present, the struggle to find essentially regulatory solutions within trust law is undermining the availability of benefits. Lawsuits for non-compliance with claims processing regulations are increasing in complexit as courts vainly sift through arcane trust law in a quest for sensible solutions. 196 Instead, a consumer-oriented regulatory solution would provide the clarity and predictability that those seeking healthcare should have.
Claims Processing Compliance Through a Presumed-Harm Approach Akin to that of the Truth in Lending Laws
The DOL has issued additional language strengthening claims procedure regulation.197 In order to be effective, though, the regulations must carry significant, clear consequences for non-compliance. The enforcement provisions of TILA and its Regulation Z exemplify the kind of provisions that could, if adopted as part of ERISA's enforcement provisions and regulations, increase compliance with claims processing regulations.
TILA concerns consumer credit, requiring certain disclosures from those who extend credit.198 The law was written to address the concern that Americans were uninformed in taking on debt and needed transparency regarding credit terms.199 TILA's goal was to require disclosures of finance charges and related information so that consumers could find the best terms available to them; TILA also aimed to protect consumers against inaccurate credit billing. 200 Although ERISA and TILA concern different subjects, these two laws have much in common. Like ERISA, TILA was enacted to address a problem that affected the finances of individuals. ERISA and TILA both regulate an area of law that affects millions of consumer transactions. 20 1 Both statutes sought to bring uniformity to their respective areas.202 Moreover, the legislative histories of both ERISA and TILA show an overriding concern for communication and clarity. 203 In the case of ERISA, as explained above, the initial concern was solvency of pension plans; only later did it come to play a significant role in the regulation of healthcare coverage.204 As a result, ERISA affects not just the finances but also the health of millions of individuals. While both TILA and ERISA concern matters that affect families' lives, TILA holds defendants to exacting standards and enforcement requires no showing of individual harm-features that are absent from the enforcement of ERISA's claims processing regulations.
Where enforcement is concerned, the two statutes and their regulations are quite different.205 TILA contains specific statutory remedies for specific violations.206 First, a TILA plaintiff has a cause of action to recover any actual damage sustained by the plaintiff. 207 Second, the plaintiff can recover statutory damages of twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, except that the award cannot be less than $100 or greater than $1,000. 208 Third, a court has discretion to award statutory damages in the amount of the lesser of $500,000 or one percent of the defendant's net worth in a class action.209 The statute also provides for criminal penalties for willful and knowing 210 violations.
Significantly, the award of statutory damages results from the violation of the statute, rather than any particular effect upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff need not show any specific harm flowing from the non-compliance; lenders are generally held strictly liable for inaccuracies, even if there is no showing that the inaccuracies are misleading.211 In one case, for example, the plaintiffs did not speak or read English and so could not have read the disclosures had they been given. But statutory damages were awarded based on an objective evaluation of the disclosures' compliance with the statute. 2 12 While TILA imposes strict liability on lenders, it also contains a "bona fide error" defense for technical mistakes or mistakes made despite "the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error." 2 13 A defendant can avoid liability by showing an error of calculation or omission occurred, and that the defendant employed rocedures, such as accuracy reviews, to ensure that mistakes were not made.
By most accounts, TILA is effective in encouraging regulatory compliance and straightforward enforcement. Indeed, it has been called "a tremendous success."
The "modest automatic statutory penalty" described above is particularly effective, one court notes, where "actual damages were perhaps nonexistent and [are], in any event, almost impossible to prove." 2 16 As previously described, the harm that results when administrators fail to comply with ERISA's claims processing regulations is similarly difficult to prove, hard to quantify, and in some individual cases non-existent. Like TILA, ERISA contains statutory penalty provisions related to healthcare claims. ERISA provides for a $110 per day penalty for each day following the expiration of thirty days following a Participant's request for a Summary Plan Description 217; ERISA also provides statutory penalties for failure to provide appropriate COBRA notices.218 But with regard to disclosure of other required information, such as the basis for a claim denial or the Participant's right to appeal, the regulations do not provide any specific remedy. Given the likelihood of Participant attrition during the appeal and litigation process, then, the incentive is to skimp on communications that would focus Participants on particular reasons for claim denials or that would provide Participants with information about how advance their appeals.
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If reforms were enacted such that certain violations of claims processing regulations led to specific monetary penalties, all parties would have greater certainty as to their expectations with regard to the claims processing procedures and outcomes. The important concerns of uniformity and predictability-for Participants, Payors, and their administrators-would equally be served by strict liability for departures from the claims processing regulations. Participants should be able to expect that the regulations applicable to healthcare claims are followed-that, for example, a review intended to be "full and fair" and completed within a certain period of time actually will be so.220 Pa. 1987 220. Some aspects of the claims process are more susceptible to strict application of penalties than others. For example, the presence or absence of required language in a notice to participants would be more straightforward to assess than whether a plan administrator conducted the required "full and fair" review. However, any lack of clarity in the standard for compliance suggests not that enforcement should be lessened, but that the standard lacks the necessary specificity. At present, Uniformity and predictability are important to plan administrators and Payors too, as liabilities are difficult to manage if plans are subject to a variety of interpretations.221 The Court's solution to the problem of uniformity is for the plan administrator's decision on claims to be given maximum deference, so that Payors and their administrators can plan their affairs and not be subject to varying interpretations of the plan by different federal courts.222 But given this adherence to deferential review--even where the plan administrator's initial interpretation of a plan is completely mistaken-accurate claims processing is even more important. With penalties that would ensure a firm commitment to claims processing regulations, administrators would be more likely to have uniform claims processing procedures in place, and therefore to avoid inaccurate claim denials. Similarly, on appeal, administrators would be more likely to conduct the required full and fair review of denied claims, so that any improperly denied claims could be granted administratively, instead of in litigation, in keeping with ERISA's goals.223 Thus, clear monetary penalties for claims procedure non-compliance would increase uniformity and predictability.
Set out below are the same examples of problematic health insurer practices that are described in Section II.B above. Currently, these practices go all but unremedied under ERISA. A reformed TILA-like regime would provide a specific, monetary remedy for the following breaches of claims regulations, with the same kind of bona fide error defense that TILA provides:
*Denying a claim incorrectly upon initial filing, then, if the Participant appeals, paying the claim upon first-level internal appeal. Under a more effective enforcement regime, the administrator could be subject to a modest penalty, geared to the dollar amount of the claim; as with TILA, administrators could avoid the penalty completely through a "bona fide error" defense which demonstrates that procedures are in place to avoid errors.
*Denying certain types of claims incorrectly upon initialfiling, then
paying them during litigation. Similar to the example above, the administrator could be subject to a modest penalty, but increased by a multiplier to reflect the Participant's additional time and trouble, so that it is larger than the penalty for paying the claim any risk of confusion or lack of clarity in the regulations falls on Participants, because Payors can maneuver at will within any areas of uncertainty. 221. HEALTH, EDUC. & HUM. SERVS. Div., supra note 63, at 25 (noting that the Department of Labor and others favor stronger remedies for non-compliance with the claims process, so that "upstream" compliance is improved).
222. Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1650 (2010) (noting that the creation of ad hoc exceptions to deferential review would cause uniformity problems in plan interpretation).
223. Id. at 1649 (noting that ERISA encourages claims to be handled at the administrative level rather than through litigation). Settlements have included terms that increase transparency and predictability in claims processing, such as the inclusion of specific, detailed definitions of certain plan terms, 237 interest payments for claims paid beyond deadlines, rohibitions against specific actions with regard to billing codes, and other terms.
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Reform through class action, however, is a poor substitute for broader reform.239 First, Participants are not typically parties to these agreements. Plaintiff classes of healthcare providers are certified more readily than classes of Participants, due to the perceived individual facts and lack of uniform defendant 240 actions surrounding the claims.
The settlement agreements therefore carve out special rules that do not include all ERISA stakeholders. When Participants are not class members, the resulting agreements, while beneficial to Participants, are geared to the providers' concerns.241 Second, only providers can enforce the agreements' terms; Participants are left out.242 Third, the agreements vary from lawsuit to lawsuit, so that no generally accepted standards emerge. Fourth, the agreements do not result in enduring change because they expire after a certain term of years.
3
The class action settlement agreements do, however, show that a reform movement is underway, but also that the results at present are uneven. Consistent, inclusive, and effective reform must come from changes to ERISA and its regulations, so that the rules are applicable to all.
CONCLUSION
When Participants and their advocates press for ERISA reform, employers and health insurance companies often respond that employee benefits are purely voluntary initiatives, and that if the provision of benefits is too onerous, employers may simply decline to provide them.244 Even so, employee benefits should not be confused with charity. Employees generally accept benefits in lieu of additional compensation. In turn, employers are able to attract employees by providing benefit packages and are able to receive favorable tax treatment in order to do so. 24 And employees generally contribute to premium costs as well.246 More importantly, however, the voluntary nature of the system does not excuse the provision of illusory or unfair benefits. In any employer calculation of the cost of benefits, employers should take into account that all regulations and rules will be followed carefully.
The need for new remedies for improper processing of healthcare claims is more pressing than ever. More than 177 million Americans receive health care through their employers,247 and ERISA plans are now the vehicle for providing the majority of healthcare coverage for those not eligible for Medicare. In addition, increasing numbers of ERISA plans are self-insured,248 therefore com/pages/highmark.html (last visited April 24, 2011) (describing procedures to dispute compliance with settlement terms).
243 Whether increased penalties for regulatory violations could be developed by the DOL or by Congress depends on the scope of reform. ERISA gives the DOL authority to "prescribe such regulations as .. . necessary or ap ropriate to carry out" the statutory provisions securing employee benefit rights.
Thus, targeted, additional regulations to strengthen claims processing could be viewed as securing existing ERISA terms and mandates. If regulatory reform were to broaden significantly the penalties for improper processing so as to change fundamentally the remedies available under ERISA, the regulations might be considered beyond the scope of the DOL's authority such that congressional action would be needed to amend the underlying statute. 25 2
The DOL regulations continue to evolve as a result of the PPACA.253 As the regulations continue to be refined and strengthened, meaningful enforcement of claims processing procedures should be a priority. The incentives to underpay or deny claims still outweigh any consequence, even with the regulatory reforms resulting from the PPACA. Correct, prompt claims processing should not be left to chance or benevolence-direct, specific penalties should counterbalance the financial pressures on health insurance companies and ensure the provision of benefits as Congress intended.
249. WOOTEN, supra note 11, at 284 (noting the "backlash" against ERISA's lack of remedies and the increase in reform initiatives and noting that these reforms do not reach self-funded plans).
250. Conkright, 130 S. Ct. at 1650 (noting that the creation of ad hoc exceptions to deferential review would cause uniformity problems in plan interpretation). 
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